## BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, MESRA, RANCHI (END SEMESTER EXAMINATION)

CLASS: BRANCH	IMSc. I: QEDS		SEMESTER : III SESSION : MO/202	22
TIME:	3:00 Hours	SUBJECT: ED203 INTERMEDIATE MICROECO	NOMICS FULL MARKS: 50	
INSTRUCTIONS: 1. The question paper contains 5 questions each of 10 marks and total 50 marks. 2. Attempt all questions. 3. The missing data, if any, may be assumed suitably. 4. Before attempting the question paper, be sure that you have got the correct question paper. 5. Tables/Data hand book/Graph paper etc. to be supplied to the candidates in the examination hall.				
Q.1(a) Q.1(b) Q.1(c)	Compare Stackelb Suppose there are inverse market de function $c(y_2) =$	and its difference from monopoly. [CO1] erg and Bertrand strategy. [CO1] e two firms in a price leadership model, ITC is emand curve is D(p) = a-bp, where p is the pri $y_2^2/2$ and the leader, Pepsi, has a cost function r and follower? [CO1]	follower and Pepsi is leader. The ce. The follower, ITC, has a cost	[2] [3] [5]
Q.2(a)		ase in number of skilled labour. Describe how this	will shift the labour supply curve.	[2]
Q.2(b) Q.2(c)		actors of production that produces goods and serv marginal product" and its usage for deriving dem		[3] [5]
Q.3(a) Q.3(b) Q.3(c)	production externa Explain the first an Consider a pure-ex Smriti = (10;0) and colour pencil (c).	on possibility frontier concave with respect to alities) [CO3] nd second fundamental theorem of welfare econo xchange economy with two individuals, Smriti and d Kriti = (0;10), that is, Smriti owns all units of pe Assuming that utility functions for Smriti is u <sub>s</sub> = m areto efficient allocation in this case? [CO3]	omics. [CO3] I Kriti. Initial endowments are ns (p) and Kriti owns all units of	[2] [3] [5]
Q.4(a) Q.4(b) Q.4(c)	Explain the Rawlsi	tion considered fair? [CO4] ian social welfare function. [CO4] w's Impossibility Theorem. Which option out of	three will you give up and why?	[2] [3] [5]
Q.5(a) Q.5(b) Q.5(c)	Explain how prope A steel plant and steel plant faces r	ly of commons by giving an example. [CO5] erty rights can remove inefficiency in case of nega a fishery are next to each other. The Steel plant no external cost to producing pollution. The cost s is steel produced and x is pollution. The price of	produces steel and pollution. The function of steel plant is c(s,x) =	[2] [3] [5]

 $s^{2}+(x-2)^{2}$ , where s is steel produced and x is pollution. The price of steel is Rs. 15 per unit. The cost function of fishery is  $c(f) = f^{2}+xf$ , where f is number of fish. The price of fish is Rs. 5 per unit. Calculate the external cost of pollution inflicted on fishery by Steel plant. [CO5]

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